<p>A dual-channel supply chain with a supplier and a retailer is considered under customer product information perception uncertainty in the online channel and market demand uncertainty. The supplier may adopt blockchain in the online channel to ensure information transparency and enhance product traceability. Fuzzy robust optimization is used to deal with market demand uncertainty. The demand functions of the online and offline channels are set up. Stackelberg game models are formulated to analyze the problem, and backward induction is used to obtain robust equilibrium solutions. The impacts of the parameters on the equilibrium prices, demands, and profits of the supply chain and its members are analyzed. The theoretical results are verified through numerical experiments and corresponding managerial insights and suggestions are provided. The results show that blockchain adoption generally benefits the supplier, but not necessarily the retailer, by increasing product information transparency. Blockchain adoption may increase the supplier’s profit under strict conditions but may negatively impact the supply chain and its members under improper conditions. The prevalent supply chain contracts are explored to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with blockchain adoption. The results show that the profit-sharing contract can, but the two-part tariff and the revenue-sharing contracts cannot, coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with blockchain adoption in the online channel.</p>

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Fuzzy robust optimization for a dual-channel supply chain with blockchain adoption under consumer perception and demand uncertainties

  • Mingli Yuan,
  • Ruozhen Qiu,
  • Minghe Sun,
  • Zhi-Ping Fan

摘要

A dual-channel supply chain with a supplier and a retailer is considered under customer product information perception uncertainty in the online channel and market demand uncertainty. The supplier may adopt blockchain in the online channel to ensure information transparency and enhance product traceability. Fuzzy robust optimization is used to deal with market demand uncertainty. The demand functions of the online and offline channels are set up. Stackelberg game models are formulated to analyze the problem, and backward induction is used to obtain robust equilibrium solutions. The impacts of the parameters on the equilibrium prices, demands, and profits of the supply chain and its members are analyzed. The theoretical results are verified through numerical experiments and corresponding managerial insights and suggestions are provided. The results show that blockchain adoption generally benefits the supplier, but not necessarily the retailer, by increasing product information transparency. Blockchain adoption may increase the supplier’s profit under strict conditions but may negatively impact the supply chain and its members under improper conditions. The prevalent supply chain contracts are explored to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with blockchain adoption. The results show that the profit-sharing contract can, but the two-part tariff and the revenue-sharing contracts cannot, coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with blockchain adoption in the online channel.