<p>Many counterintuitive thought experiments have been proposed in the domain of anthropic reasoning (and elsewhere). Here, I argue that the ultimate cause of paradoxical consequences in most of them lies in unwarranted assumptions about the non-standard or anomalous capacities of the hypothesized agents, rather than in assumptions related to anthropic selection itself. In particular, agents with unphysical or anomalous causal capacities present genuine stumbling blocks to legitimate inferences in such cases. The controversial Doomsday Argument, which does not involve agent causation or anomalous capacities, therefore remains intact as far as the reasoning is concerned; this does not imply endorsement of any of its conventional interpretations. Rejecting appeals to unphysical or anomalous causal capacities supports a desirable reaffirmation of the epistemic primacy of physical laws. More generally, the deflationary view of non-standard agents and their causal capacities advanced here could have salutary effects on thought experiments across philosophy, cosmology, and fundamental physics.</p>