The chemical element category and classificatory norms: better understanding how science works
摘要
From discoveries of oxygen and X-rays, to those of DNA and the Higgs boson, some of the most celebrated and productive achievements in science involve profound theories about scientific categories. Accordingly, philosophers have asked and pursued many questions about scientific categories, but these have tended to be ontological or metaphysical questions. We uncover and formulate a seldom addressed methodological or inferential question about epistemic practice—about how scientists in fact attempt to justify theories about the definitive natures, or constitutive conditions, of categories. We explain how a lack of sufficient attention to this constitutivity inference question reflects a gap in knowledge about how science works. Then we contribute to answering the question by focusing on two twentieth century periods of chemistry, showing that and how scientists sometimes rely on value-laden norms of scientific classification in their inferences to constitutivity theories about categories. This finding raises several interesting questions.