<p>Financing is a common behavior for capital-constrained retailers. To develop recycling business, these capital-constrained retailers may seek trade credit financing (TCF) from manufacturers. This study aims to explore the recycling and pricing decisions of two financing retailers in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). Three game models are established: collusion, competition and Stackelberg. Our findings reveal that the capital-constrained retailer who has larger market power do not necessarily dominate the decision-making. Our findings also demonstrate that the manufacturer should appropriately lower the financing rate to incentivize retailers to recycle, which can in turn increase its own profit. Additionally, under the collusion and competition models, the CLSC has the lowest profits and social welfare, and peak environmental impact is reached when the retailers hold an equal market share. Furthermore, the competition strategy exhibits excellent economic benefits and social welfare but higher environmental impacts. Surprisingly, there exists a Pareto area in the transfer price regardless of the strategy. Therefore, optimal environmental and economic outcomes could be reached by all of the involved parties with any of the examined strategies.</p>