Evolutionary game analysis of governments, enterprises and consumers in resilient food supply chains during emergencies
摘要
Food supply chains, crucial for sustaining livelihoods in emergencies, have received considerable attention in recent years. While there has been some research on evolutionary game analysis of food supply chains, few have focused on the resilience and social responsibility, especially in emergency contexts. To bridge this gap, this study creatively introduces the concept of resilience sensitivity and constructs a food supply chain evolutionary game system composed of governments, enterprises and consumers with resilience sensitivity, aiming to identify the evolutionary stable strategies of the system. The results confirm the critical impact and essential value of resilience sensitivity, revealing the substantial role of food characteristics. On the one hand, even with a low level of resilience sensitivity, consumers will assertively adopt rational consumption regardless of food characteristics. On the other hand, for perishable foods, regardless of resilience sensitivity, enterprises tend to adopt negative resilience strategies, while consumers stick to rational consumption. Additionally, this study confirms the positive effect of penalties on resilience strategy. Surprisingly, improving subsidies to enterprises by reducing welfare to consumers is more valuable for supply chain resilience. Based on findings above, this study contributes to engineering practices for the resilient food supply chains during emergencies.