<p>Several philosophers have endorsed motive-based objections to paternalism. On their view, paternalism is wrong primarily insofar as it involves treating others on the basis of negative judgments about their abilities to advance their own interests. This essay argues that the motive-based account has difficulty accommodating common views about Ulysses contracts. In Ulysses contracts, people seek to foreclose certain options they might otherwise have in the future, typically from fear that they will choose imprudently. If one honors a Ulysses contract by removing options in accordance with a subject’s past request, one appears to demonstrate a negative judgment about the subject’s present abilities. The motive-based account thus seems to imply, problematically, that enforcing a Ulysses contract is generally paternalistic. Three replies to this argument are considered. A first accepts the implication that it is generally paternalistic to enforce a Ulysses contract. A second holds that enforcing a Ulysses contract need not be disrespectful even if it is motivated by a negative judgment about the subject. A third holds that enforcing a Ulysses contract need not involve an on-balance negative judgment about the subject’s agency across time. Each response raises serious problems for the motive-based account. </p>