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<p>It is widely held that hypocrites lack standing to blame. Leading accounts explain this by reference to some fault of the hypocritical blamer, such as a rejection of the equality of persons or insufficient commitment to the relevant norm. Recently, however, some theorists have rejected these <i>fault-based</i> accounts in favor of a novel proposal: having the standing to blame another individual requires being better than them with respect to the relevant norm. We argue that extant defenses of these “<i>be better</i>” accounts fail, and such accounts face a host of objections that cast doubt on their truth.</p>

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You Don’t Have to be Better to Blame

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月30日

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  • Kyle G. Fritz,
  • Daniel J. Miller

摘要

It is widely held that hypocrites lack standing to blame. Leading accounts explain this by reference to some fault of the hypocritical blamer, such as a rejection of the equality of persons or insufficient commitment to the relevant norm. Recently, however, some theorists have rejected these fault-based accounts in favor of a novel proposal: having the standing to blame another individual requires being better than them with respect to the relevant norm. We argue that extant defenses of these “be better” accounts fail, and such accounts face a host of objections that cast doubt on their truth.