Scholarlink

<p>So-called “deepfakes” (i.e., highly believable but fabricated media) are infamous for their potential political application. However, they can also contain false information about individuals, which raises the question whether deepfakes can violate a moral right to privacy. This question is directly related to the often ignored but still highly contentious issue of whether the spreading or use of false or fake information can violate a moral right to privacy. While such queries normally turn on how we conceptualize a moral right to privacy, they are answered here based on premises that any conception of the moral right to privacy must adhere to.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Can Deepfakes Violate an Individual’s Moral Right to Privacy?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月6日

查看全文
  • Björn Lundgren

摘要

So-called “deepfakes” (i.e., highly believable but fabricated media) are infamous for their potential political application. However, they can also contain false information about individuals, which raises the question whether deepfakes can violate a moral right to privacy. This question is directly related to the often ignored but still highly contentious issue of whether the spreading or use of false or fake information can violate a moral right to privacy. While such queries normally turn on how we conceptualize a moral right to privacy, they are answered here based on premises that any conception of the moral right to privacy must adhere to.