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<p>Since 1999, scholars have queried whether Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy would render problematic, wrong, or impermissible the performance of gratuitous violence and non-consensual sexual acts available in videogames and multiplayer virtual realms. Some contend that it does, some that it does not, and some ponder whether Kant provides grounds to prohibit legal access. This article posits that the scholarship has either misread Kant or read him incompletely, and a defensible reading of Kant reveals better strategies to address the issue than what has been proposed. Part I asserts that the commission of virtual taboos cannot be legally prohibited unless it raised the legitimate concern that someone else’s freedom might be hindered. Part II argues the commission of virtual taboos does not quite fall afoul of Kant’s “supreme principle of morality” when applied only to the <i>perfect</i>,<i> negative duties</i> gameplayers have to themselves. Part III argues that they do fall afoul of the supreme principle of morality when applied to the <i>imperfect</i>,<i> positive duties</i> gameplayers have to their self-perfection and membership in a “moral world.” Part IV provides further evidence from Kant’s aesthetics that renders virtual taboos impermissible.</p>

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Reading and misreading Kant in relation to virtual taboos

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月4日

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  • Andrew Kimbrough

摘要

Since 1999, scholars have queried whether Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy would render problematic, wrong, or impermissible the performance of gratuitous violence and non-consensual sexual acts available in videogames and multiplayer virtual realms. Some contend that it does, some that it does not, and some ponder whether Kant provides grounds to prohibit legal access. This article posits that the scholarship has either misread Kant or read him incompletely, and a defensible reading of Kant reveals better strategies to address the issue than what has been proposed. Part I asserts that the commission of virtual taboos cannot be legally prohibited unless it raised the legitimate concern that someone else’s freedom might be hindered. Part II argues the commission of virtual taboos does not quite fall afoul of Kant’s “supreme principle of morality” when applied only to the perfect, negative duties gameplayers have to themselves. Part III argues that they do fall afoul of the supreme principle of morality when applied to the imperfect, positive duties gameplayers have to their self-perfection and membership in a “moral world.” Part IV provides further evidence from Kant’s aesthetics that renders virtual taboos impermissible.