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<p>I argue that because many forms of viewpoint-based moderation by major social media companies (SMCs) undermine subjects’ equal opportunity for political influence (EOPI), such moderation violates users’ right to free expression and ought to be prohibited. I then refute three common defenses of SMCs’ freedom to moderate as they please, each of which seeks to establish relevant disanalogies between state- and SMC-imposed speech regulations: the substitution argument, argument from government abuse, and argument from corporate rights. I argue that the presence of substitutes does not excuse viewpoint-based regulation, that the risk of abuse does not meaningfully distinguish state from social media moderation, and that corporate rights are limited by users’ right to EOPI.</p>

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Limiting the right to moderate: political equality, social media, and viewpoint-based moderation

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  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月23日

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  • Chris Bousquet

摘要

I argue that because many forms of viewpoint-based moderation by major social media companies (SMCs) undermine subjects’ equal opportunity for political influence (EOPI), such moderation violates users’ right to free expression and ought to be prohibited. I then refute three common defenses of SMCs’ freedom to moderate as they please, each of which seeks to establish relevant disanalogies between state- and SMC-imposed speech regulations: the substitution argument, argument from government abuse, and argument from corporate rights. I argue that the presence of substitutes does not excuse viewpoint-based regulation, that the risk of abuse does not meaningfully distinguish state from social media moderation, and that corporate rights are limited by users’ right to EOPI.