<p>Two main and related epistemological questions feature in the philosophy of emotions: can emotions justify evaluative beliefs, and if they can, what explains their justificatory role? In this paper I join the effort to answer both questions. I acknowledge the skepticism regarding emotions providing us with evidence and frame the skepticism as a result of two features of emotions: (a) that they have input states and (b) that they are rationally evaluable. However, I argue that this skepticism can be addressed and the stalemate that it has created in the philosophy of emotions can be broken. To do so, I turn to the literature on evidence of evidence, hitherto restricted to discussions of the epistemic value of experts and peer disagreement. I argue that emotions can sometimes provide us with evidence in virtue of providing us with evidence of evidence. This account ascribes emotions with a significant epistemic role, as possible justifiers of evaluative beliefs. It also provides us with a way of thinking of emotions as foundational in a specific, albeit weak way&#xa0;–emotions are quasi-foundational.</p>