<p>The accuracy of anorexia patients’ claims about their own agency (or self-control), are at the center of this discussion. Patients’ typically believe, even boast, that their dietary behavior involves effortful restraint. In recent work Evans has argued that the experiential sense of agency underlying such claims is often not veridical, generating illusory claims to self-control. Empirical findings on AN patients employing implicit measures of the sense of agency—intertemporal reasoning in delay-discounting studies, and a temporal binding approach—seem pertinent to Evans’ hypothesis. But these studies fail to support, and even apparently challenge, the position that such patients’ sense of agency might be inaccurate or illusory, I illustrate. I note epistemic vulnerabilities in Evans’ data, and interpretive ambiguities associated with applying predictive processing models as Evans does. Without additional support, the claim that these assertions are illusion-based is not persuasive, I conclude. And, even if other cognitive and affective symptoms indicate disorder, based on what is presently known, the same cannot yet be concluded of AN claims to self-control.</p>