<p>Stance voluntarism holds that the choice between rival stances in philosophical disagreements cannot be compelled by epistemic reasons alone. This paper examines a prominent account of stance voluntarism—developed in Chakravartty (Scientific ontology: Integrating naturalized metaphysics and voluntarist epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2017), referred to as CSV—assessing whether it fosters progress in philosophical debate, with particular attention to the scientific realism debate. Progress in this debate is possible even when disagreements persist, insofar as the debate can enrich our understanding by bringing to light elements and relations that are overlooked or misrepresented. With this in mind, the paper introduces a notion of usefulness specific to meta-philosophical positions: their capacity to facilitate philosophical activities, such as argumentation, thought experiments, and case study analysis, that advance first-order philosophical debates. The paper thus argues that, on a rigorous reading, CSV leaves little room for the activities that may challenge the stances underlying first-order philosophical positions or drive the emergence of more coherent alternatives. Furthermore, it contends that the relationship between the stances that CSV takes to underlie first-order philosophical positions and the positions actually found in the scientific realism debate remains problematic. The paper also considers a more liberal reading of CSV that allows philosophical activities conducive to progress in first-order debates, suggesting that adopting this reading requires certain revisions.</p>