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<p>Epistemic Contrastivism is the thesis that, for any proposition A, one does not simply know that A. Rather, one knows A rather than some set of alternatives. Typically, arguments for Epistemic Contrastivism have relied on intuitions regarding knowledge ascriptions in ordinary language. In this article, I offer a novel argument for Epistemic Contrastivism (at least with respect to lottery propositions) from considerations of the Lottery Paradox. Recent treatments of the Lottery Paradox demonstrate that Doxastic Contrastivism, the thesis that rational belief is contrastive, provides powerful resources to resolve this paradox. Insofar as Doxastic Contrastivism entails Epistemic Contrastivism (assuming some contrastive beliefs constitute knowledge), these resources are only available if we accept Epistemic Contrastivism as well. The article has three sections. In the first, I give a brief overview of contrastivism in general, beforeexplaining Epistemic Contrastivism and Doxastic Contrastivism. In the second, I turn to the Lottery Paradox, and explain how recent work in formal epistemology supportsEpistemic Contrastivism. In the third, I show how these formal theories have resources to answer objections that have been raised against Epistemic Contrastivism and Doxastic Contrastivism.</p>

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From the Lottery Paradox to Epistemic Contrastivism

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月9日

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  • Gerrit Neels

摘要

Epistemic Contrastivism is the thesis that, for any proposition A, one does not simply know that A. Rather, one knows A rather than some set of alternatives. Typically, arguments for Epistemic Contrastivism have relied on intuitions regarding knowledge ascriptions in ordinary language. In this article, I offer a novel argument for Epistemic Contrastivism (at least with respect to lottery propositions) from considerations of the Lottery Paradox. Recent treatments of the Lottery Paradox demonstrate that Doxastic Contrastivism, the thesis that rational belief is contrastive, provides powerful resources to resolve this paradox. Insofar as Doxastic Contrastivism entails Epistemic Contrastivism (assuming some contrastive beliefs constitute knowledge), these resources are only available if we accept Epistemic Contrastivism as well. The article has three sections. In the first, I give a brief overview of contrastivism in general, beforeexplaining Epistemic Contrastivism and Doxastic Contrastivism. In the second, I turn to the Lottery Paradox, and explain how recent work in formal epistemology supportsEpistemic Contrastivism. In the third, I show how these formal theories have resources to answer objections that have been raised against Epistemic Contrastivism and Doxastic Contrastivism.