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<p>In the wake of the upsurge in revisionist accounts of logical empiricism and, in particular, the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, there has emerged an interest in exploring similarities between some of the key concepts and ideas found in the work of Carnap and Thomas Kuhn’s famed account of scientific change. The aim of this paper is to investigate a particular aspect of this similarity relation, namely: the purported similarity of Carnap’s notion of <i>linguistic framework</i> and Kuhn’s notion of <i>paradigm</i>. After some expository remarks in which I explicate each of these concepts individually (including Carnap’s notion of <i>scientific theory</i> and Kuhn’s later notion of <i>lexicon</i>), I show that linguistic frameworks and paradigms may be said to be <i>functionally</i> similar with respect to Carnap’s and Kuhn’s wider views on the structure of science. Nevertheless, I argue we should resist the urge to construe linguistic frameworks as formalized counterparts of paradigms, as has been suggested by some interpreters.</p>

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Linguistic Frameworks, Paradigms, and the Carnap-Kuhn Connection

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月17日

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  • Bobby Vos

摘要

In the wake of the upsurge in revisionist accounts of logical empiricism and, in particular, the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, there has emerged an interest in exploring similarities between some of the key concepts and ideas found in the work of Carnap and Thomas Kuhn’s famed account of scientific change. The aim of this paper is to investigate a particular aspect of this similarity relation, namely: the purported similarity of Carnap’s notion of linguistic framework and Kuhn’s notion of paradigm. After some expository remarks in which I explicate each of these concepts individually (including Carnap’s notion of scientific theory and Kuhn’s later notion of lexicon), I show that linguistic frameworks and paradigms may be said to be functionally similar with respect to Carnap’s and Kuhn’s wider views on the structure of science. Nevertheless, I argue we should resist the urge to construe linguistic frameworks as formalized counterparts of paradigms, as has been suggested by some interpreters.