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<p>Call metaphysicians who think that chains of ontological dependence must terminate in a collection of fundamental entities <i>foundationalists</i>. Call metaphysicians who think that chains of being can proceed ad infinitum <i>infinitists</i>. Foundationalists claim that foundationalism displays certain theoretical advantages over infinitism. First, some maintain that infinitism has a special explanatory problem that foundationalism doesn’t. Second, others maintain that foundationalism exhibits greater theoretical unity than infinitism. I argue that these considerations give us no reason to prefer foundationalism to infinitism. Against the foundationalist’s first purported advantage, I argue that foundationalists must make theoretical concessions similar to those infinitists must make (Sect.&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec1">1</InternalRef>). And against the foundationalist’s second purported advantage – an advantage infinitists haven’t yet addressed – I argue that infinitism exhibits a different, but nevertheless attractive, kind of theoretical virtue; namely, infinitists explain all existence facts in similar ways (Sect.&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec5">2</InternalRef>). I conclude that foundationalism and infinitism are, at worst, on a theoretical par (Sect.&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec10">3</InternalRef>).</p>

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Metaphysical Infinitism and Theoretical Virtue

  • 期刊论文

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月11日

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  • Evan Welchance

摘要

Call metaphysicians who think that chains of ontological dependence must terminate in a collection of fundamental entities foundationalists. Call metaphysicians who think that chains of being can proceed ad infinitum infinitists. Foundationalists claim that foundationalism displays certain theoretical advantages over infinitism. First, some maintain that infinitism has a special explanatory problem that foundationalism doesn’t. Second, others maintain that foundationalism exhibits greater theoretical unity than infinitism. I argue that these considerations give us no reason to prefer foundationalism to infinitism. Against the foundationalist’s first purported advantage, I argue that foundationalists must make theoretical concessions similar to those infinitists must make (Sect. 1). And against the foundationalist’s second purported advantage – an advantage infinitists haven’t yet addressed – I argue that infinitism exhibits a different, but nevertheless attractive, kind of theoretical virtue; namely, infinitists explain all existence facts in similar ways (Sect. 2). I conclude that foundationalism and infinitism are, at worst, on a theoretical par (Sect. 3).