<p>Recent discussions of acquaintance typically assume three claims: (i) acquaintance is a form of knowledge of qualitative character, (ii) acquaintance constitutes phenomenal consciousness, and (iii) necessarily, mental qualities are phenomenally conscious. This paper argues that, although each claim is independently attractive, together they generate a trilemma. Drawing on a general anti-triviality constraint on first-order empirical knowledge, I argue that if acquaintance both constitutes consciousness and is directed at necessarily conscious qualities, then the object of acquaintance becomes metaphysically dependent on the epistemic relation itself. In that case, acquaintance fails to disclose an independently existing object and thereby its epistemic significance is trivialized. Acquaintance theorists can retain any two of these commitments but not all three. I map the resulting logical space, sketch the principal costs of abandoning each limb of the triad, and call on acquaintance theorists to take a principled stand on which limb of the triad they are willing to abandon or revise.</p>