<p>Modern Meinongians and <i>noneists</i> assume that objects of thought are objects and so, when we think or speak about what does not exist, we are speaking and thinking about non-existent objects. Yet the existence of non-existent objects appears paradoxical and was rejected by Russell. Perhaps surprisingly, Russell suggested that Frege, as well as Meinong, proposed that some objects of thought, even when they don’t exist, have kind of a Being, which is in no way dependent on their being objects of thought. Russell had in mind the fact that, according to Frege, what enables us to think and speak about what does not exist is that we can think about empty concepts and unasserted thoughts. These have a kind of being different from objects, which are identified by their location in spacetime. Properties, processes, similarities, functions, thoughts, and concepts, as well as objects, can be objects of thought. Frege’s semantics makes them objects of thought, without assimilating them to objects. This, it is argued, is an advantage of his semantics over that of <i>noneists</i>. However, Frege did recognise one non-existent object, the False, so a tweak to his semantics is proposed to eliminate reference to this non-existent object. Finally, it is argued that not only does Frege’s introduction of functions allow him to avoid Meinong’s distinction between <i>bestehen</i> and <i>existieren</i>, what Meinong intended, when he spoke of <i>Sosein</i> and <i>Sein</i>, is better captured using Frege’s distinction between the instantiation of a concept by an object and the subordination of one concept to another. Ultimately, it is claimed that anything Meinong does, Frege does better. Fregeans do everything better than <i>noneists</i>.</p>