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<p>In his recent paper “No Trespassing! Abandoning the Novice/Expert Problem”, Levy (Erkenntnis, 2024, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8</a>) urges (social) epistemologists to give up on trying to solve the novice/expert problem and the dissent problem. According to him, novices who ground their attributions of trust on general criteria of expertise evaluation are claimed to commit some sort of epistemic fallacy. This paper advances reasons to be wary of his view and suggests another way to look at the novice/expert problem, where novices are given back some epistemological traction in rationally building trust in experts.</p>

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On Meta-Expertise, Dissent and Epistemic Trespassing: A Reply to Neil Levy

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月21日

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  • Doan Q. C. Vu Duc,
  • Quentin Hiernaux,
  • Olivier Sartenaer

摘要

In his recent paper “No Trespassing! Abandoning the Novice/Expert Problem”, Levy (Erkenntnis, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8) urges (social) epistemologists to give up on trying to solve the novice/expert problem and the dissent problem. According to him, novices who ground their attributions of trust on general criteria of expertise evaluation are claimed to commit some sort of epistemic fallacy. This paper advances reasons to be wary of his view and suggests another way to look at the novice/expert problem, where novices are given back some epistemological traction in rationally building trust in experts.