<p>Proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments claim the belief that pain is bad is among the easiest to debunk. I argue it is unclear why the tendency to have this belief would have been selected for. Pain evolved to signal and motivate us to deal with harmful extramental events (e.g., tissue damage). It also brings about evaluative judgments about its external intentional content and causes (e.g., we judge something bad is happening to our leg). I argue that such beliefs are more efficient and more reliable at getting us to deal with harm than ones about the badness of the pain itself. Thus, evaluative beliefs about extramental states of affairs are much more likely to have evolved for this purpose. Belief in the badness of pain might even have been maladaptive given it would have redirected cognitive resources away from dealing with adverse bodily conditions and onto our own mental states. These considerations make it unlikely evolutionary pressures pushed us to also think pain, the mere messenger of harm, is bad. Therefore, we lack a straightforward debunking story for these beliefs. I conclude with a vindicating explanation.</p>