<p>The close connection between attention and consciousness is widely acknowledged, yet some philosophers and psychologists defend the phenomenal overflow hypothesis according to which, in experience, we are conscious of more than we are attending to. While this view has been extensively discussed from a scientific perspective, here I approach it from a new angle: its epistemology. I claim that phenomenal overflow presents a novel epistemological challenge, which I call ‘the problem of introspective blink’. This challenge emerges from some truisms about introspection and consciousness: we primarily know our conscious states by introspection, and introspection requires attention. Thus, if there is conscious experience outside attention, there is a puzzle about our subjective access to it. I propose a solution to the problem of introspective blink, suggesting that certain conscious states can only be known through memory. I also claim that this model has consequences for cognitive science; in particular, the memory model offers novel insights to approach skepticism about subjective reports in cases of overflow.</p>