<p>Classic Truthmaker Theory (<span>ctt</span>; e.g., Armstrong and Bigelow) takes there to be a deep connection between truthmaking and <span>substantial realism</span> <span>(sr)</span>. It faces a pressing problem which no one has yet adequately addressed in defence of the truthmaker-realism link: the “Categorisation Problem”. In short, it is an explanatory challenge to articulate truthmaker realism in such a way as to categorise realisms and non-realisms correctly. This paper addresses this problem head-on. Specifically, it argues for what I call the “Aboutness Strategy”, that the problem itself overlooks something important: that the best versions of <span>ctt</span> require that truths are made true by what they are about, that is, truthmaking has an aboutness component. The details of the aboutness component, especially Berto’s “Acceptability Constraint”, let us (a) articulate conditions for realism which are superior to the currently best rival accounts, namely the “Grounding Account” and the “Debate-specific Account”, and (b) avoid the categorisation errors plaguing <span>ctt</span> as well as rivals. Therefore, looking closely at and utilising truthmaking’s aboutness conditions allow us to retain the connection between truthmaking and <span>sr</span> that classic truthmaker theorists think there is.</p>