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<p>False-premise-inference (FPI) cases—where a subject appears to acquire inferential knowledge by inferring from a false premise—challenge the standard view that inferential knowledge must be grounded in true premises. Existing responses, <i>knowledge from falsehood</i> and <i>knowledge despite falsehood</i>, prove unsatisfactory. We defend a third alternative: <i>knowledge from partial truth</i>. In FPI cases, the subject’s inferential knowledge is epistemized not by the false premise as a whole but by a true proper part of its content. Drawing on a fine-grained theory of propositional content, we show how to isolate this knowledge-generating component. Our approach resolves the puzzle by preserving the natural reading of the FPI cases while upholding the principle that knowledge-generating inferences are truth-conducive.</p>

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From Knowledge from Falsehood to Knowledge from Partial Truth

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月8日

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  • Kok Yong Lee,
  • Duen-Min Deng

摘要

False-premise-inference (FPI) cases—where a subject appears to acquire inferential knowledge by inferring from a false premise—challenge the standard view that inferential knowledge must be grounded in true premises. Existing responses, knowledge from falsehood and knowledge despite falsehood, prove unsatisfactory. We defend a third alternative: knowledge from partial truth. In FPI cases, the subject’s inferential knowledge is epistemized not by the false premise as a whole but by a true proper part of its content. Drawing on a fine-grained theory of propositional content, we show how to isolate this knowledge-generating component. Our approach resolves the puzzle by preserving the natural reading of the FPI cases while upholding the principle that knowledge-generating inferences are truth-conducive.