<p>Representationalism claims that pretense is determined in advance by the content-bearing mental representations of individual pretenders. Alternatively, 4E approaches to pretense claim that pretense emerges in agent-environment interactions and is not determined in advance by pretenders’ mental representations. Peter Langland-Hassan has offered an objection to the 4E accounts of pretense: two individuals may have the same or similar bodily movements and environments, but only one engages in pretense. However, recently, Marco Facchin and Zuzanna Rucińska have defended 4E approaches to pretense; they argue that Langland-Hassan’s cases are impossible. Nevertheless, I argue that such cases are possible, and offer some real-life examples in support of Langland-Hassan’s objection. I also argue that in distinguishing pretense from non-pretense representationalism is a more effective strategy.</p>