<p>This paper argues that the following three popular doctrines are in tension with one another: (i) <i>property essentialism</i>, the view that at least some properties have essences; (ii) the canonical reduction of modality to essence, due to Fine; and (iii) <i>Aristotelianism</i>, the view that properties cannot exist uninstantiated. I consider the different ways in which the Aristotelian might respond to the tension I raise, and I show that each of them has a metaphysically interesting upshot. I also suggest that none of the Aristotelian’s possible responses is prima facie preferable to <i>Platonism</i>, the view that properties can exist uninstantiated, and that Aristotelianism is less plausible overall than ETM or property essentialism. I tentatively conclude, then, that my arguments make a case that the property essentialist—and, more tentatively, the property realist—should embrace Platonism over Aristotelianism. My primary aim in doing so, however, is not to definitively argue for Platonism, but more modestly to raise a challenge to the Aristotelian that has not yet appeared in the literature on properties.</p>