Scholarlink

<p>Model-theoretic skepticism is a challenge to purported a priori mathematical knowledge. According to this challenge, elementary results from mathematical logic undermine our grasp of basic mathematical concepts such as finitude and countability. Despite generating rich discussion over the years, most philosophers don’t feel worried by model-theoretic skepticism, in part due to a number of notable anti-skeptical arguments. In this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and explore the question of whether (and to what extent) a skeptical threat remains.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Skepticism and Mathematics

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月5日

查看全文
  • Owain Griffin

摘要

Model-theoretic skepticism is a challenge to purported a priori mathematical knowledge. According to this challenge, elementary results from mathematical logic undermine our grasp of basic mathematical concepts such as finitude and countability. Despite generating rich discussion over the years, most philosophers don’t feel worried by model-theoretic skepticism, in part due to a number of notable anti-skeptical arguments. In this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and explore the question of whether (and to what extent) a skeptical threat remains.