Against Actual Timelessness
摘要
The idea that actually there is no time, or that for all we know there might actually be no time, has recently gained traction, with several authors arguing in favour of such a view. The metaphysical picture of timelessness that such authors defend varies, and in turn, arguments against actual timelessness are often directed at particular metaphysical pictures of timelessness. In what follows I offer a new argument against actual timelessness: the temporal illusion argument. This argument is perfectly general, in that if it succeeds, it shows that the view that actually our world is timeless is false in any of its incarnations. The temporal illusion argument is simple. It says that if actually there is no time, then temporal illusionism is true. But temporal illusionism is not true, and hence neither is actual timelessness. I elucidate this argument and then defend it from objections.