<p>According to the standard characterization, the method of cases involves eliciting judgments about particular cases and using these judgments as evidence for or against philosophical theories—much like the way empirical theories are tested. Understood in this way, the method has been criticized as unreliable, posing a serious challenge to “armchair” philosophy. The most robust defense so far has been the argument-based mischaracterization objection. However, this objection retains the quasi-empirical dialectic of the standard view and therefore may not be sufficient to deflect the charge of unreliability. The aim of this paper is to introduce a fundamentally different approach, which conceives of the method as sharing a form of reasoning with formal rather than empirical disciplines. On this alternative view, the method does not elicit case judgments but instead demonstrates certain quasi-logical facts. It is argued that while this approach is somewhat revisionary, it is nonetheless legitimate and preserves the method’s role in the advancement of philosophical knowledge.</p>