<p>When we deliberate about what to do morally, we often run two types of risk. One type of risk results from having incomplete or false information about empirical facts, such as the effectiveness of donating to a particular charity. Another type of risk results from having incomplete or false information about normative facts, such as whether animals have moral status. According to the Symmetry Thesis, empirical risk matters for what one should do morally, and so does normative risk. In this paper, I defend the Symmetry Thesis by offering a novel account of how we should understand normative risk in moral deliberation on a reason-based normative framework. On this normative framework, what one should do morally is determined by the balance of one’s moral reasons. I argue that risks play the role of modifiers: they attenuate the weight of the relevant moral reasons. Both empirical and normative risks therefore matter for what we should do morally.</p>