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<p>When&#xa0;Peter van Inwagen first&#xa0;formulated his version(s) of the consequence argument for the incompatibility of determinism and freedom&#xa0;in <i>An Essay on Free Will</i>, he went out of his way to avoid using causal or explanatory notions, utilizing solely modal ones instead. Plenty of authors followed suit and extended this purely modal approach to other issues in free will, such as the arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and freedom. Recently, several authors have argued that this was a mistake: that we cannot adequately appreciate the various problems surrounding free will if we restrict ourselves to solely (or even primarily) modal notions. This paper offers further reason to think so. It is argued that on a purely modal approach, it is easier to answer the most serious arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and freedom than the most serious arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and freedom. Since that is exactly the opposite of what we should expect, this gives us good reason to think the modal approach fails. Finally, an alternative approach is suggested, one that makes causal and explanatory notions front and center. This alternative approach not only restores the intuitive asymmetry between determinism and divine foreknowledge, but helps us make progress in these debates that are notorious for dialectical stalemates.</p>

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Articulating the Threats of Determinism and Foreknowledge: Moving Beyond Modality

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月24日

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  • Andrew Law

摘要

When Peter van Inwagen first formulated his version(s) of the consequence argument for the incompatibility of determinism and freedom in An Essay on Free Will, he went out of his way to avoid using causal or explanatory notions, utilizing solely modal ones instead. Plenty of authors followed suit and extended this purely modal approach to other issues in free will, such as the arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and freedom. Recently, several authors have argued that this was a mistake: that we cannot adequately appreciate the various problems surrounding free will if we restrict ourselves to solely (or even primarily) modal notions. This paper offers further reason to think so. It is argued that on a purely modal approach, it is easier to answer the most serious arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and freedom than the most serious arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and freedom. Since that is exactly the opposite of what we should expect, this gives us good reason to think the modal approach fails. Finally, an alternative approach is suggested, one that makes causal and explanatory notions front and center. This alternative approach not only restores the intuitive asymmetry between determinism and divine foreknowledge, but helps us make progress in these debates that are notorious for dialectical stalemates.