A Puzzle About the Unity and Normativity of Structural Rationality

Alex Worsnip argues that structural rationality is a unified phenomenon, given the constitutive facts about the natures of our mental states. He also argues that structural rationality is normatively significant, given the reasons to which its requirements give rise. This paper breaks bad news: these two parts of Worsnip’s picture are strange bedfellows, since the sequences of states and processes that would clearly count as transgressing the structural-rationality-based reasons that he describes are precisely those sequences that are ruled out by the constitutive facts about our mental states that he also describes. As a result, it is hard to see what transgressing our structural-rationality-based reasons could amount to on Worsnip’s overall picture, and thus hard to see how these reasons could be normative in an interestingly robust way. The present paper spells out this puzzle and then discusses how Worsnip might respond and how far it might generalize.