<p>This study examines the effect of government turnover on corporate green investment behavior in China. Using data on municipal-level mayoral and party-secretary transitions across Chinese cities from 2007 to 2020, matched with 1,918 firm-year observations of green investment, we find that political leadership transitions are associated with a significant increase in firms’ environmental expenditures. Drawing on Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), we argue that firms strategically increase green investment following government turnover in order to rebuild political relationships with incoming officials and secure continued access to government-controlled resources, including subsidies, tax incentives, and regulatory approvals. We find that the benefits of green investment are tangible: firms investing more in environmental projects experience reductions in tax burdens and increases in government subsidies. The effect of government turnover on green investment is amplified when incoming officials are appointed from outside the local jurisdiction, reflecting the heightened political uncertainty and relationship disruption that external appointments create. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and firms in the energy sector exhibit stronger green investment responses to political transitions, owing to their greater resource dependence on local government and higher regulatory exposure, respectively. However, the increase in politically motivated green investment is associated with a reduction in firms’ short-term financial performance, reflecting the high upfront costs of environmental expenditure. Overall, our findings advance understanding of the institutional drivers of corporate sustainability in emerging economies and offer practical guidance for policymakers seeking to leverage political transition periods to promote stable environmental investment.</p>