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Which subsidy strategy is more effective for incentivizing low-carbon housing?—An analysis based on a network game theory perspective

  • Qingzhen Yao,
  • Yue Lan

摘要

This paper develops a novel approach by integrating evolutionary game theory with the small-world network model, offering a comprehensive and detailed evaluation of the effectiveness and economic implications of three subsidy policies for promoting low-carbon behaviors: “subsidies for real estate developers based on product attributes,” “subsidies for real estate developers based on product carbon intensity,” and “subsidies for real estate developers based on research and development costs.” The analysis is conducted from the dual perspectives of evolutionary stability and system-wide payoff. This research not only expands the scope of low-carbon policy evaluation but also contributes to advancing the methodological framework in this domain, providing policymakers with a more thorough and nuanced foundation for their decision-making. Through a comparative analysis of the three subsidy policies, it is found that the policy based on product attributes is the most effective in maximizing system-wide payoffs and facilitating the rapid transition of the system to a low-carbon state. In contrast, the subsidy policy based on research and development costs proves to be the least effective in achieving an evolutionarily stable state and fails to deliver the desired system outcomes. These findings offer valuable insights for optimizing low-carbon policy design and enhancing the overall efficacy of policy implementation in the future.