<p>Accurate reporting and rigorous verification are prerequisites for biological invasion management. However, to obtain subsidies from the superior government and evade accountability for ineffective governance, some local governments often submit false information to the superior government, which seriously affects the effectiveness of controlling invasive organisms. Given the hierarchical governance system and the strategic dynamic decision-making operations involved, this paper examines the information reporting and verification of biological invasion within a signaling game framework. This study systematically analyzes the constraints and internal impact mechanisms of local government information truthful reporting, and compares the implementation effects of different “signal-verification” strategies at different stages. The results demonstrate that the local government’s reporting behavior is primarily influenced by the subsidy level, the severity of performance penalties, and beliefs regarding the superior government’s verification capacity type. Both the “weak verification signal-strong verification strategy” and the “strong verification signal-weak verification strategy” can effectively suppress speculative behavior of local governments in most situations. These strategies not only generate immediate deterrent effects but also exert a continued inhibitory influence on long-term decision-making. By optimizing financial subsidy structures and implementing differentiated performance evaluation mechanisms, the overall governance effectiveness of biological invasion management can be significantly improved.</p>