<p>The Forest Eco-Bank Policy (EBP) represents an important institutional innovation in China’s sustainable forest management, designed to overcome the “resource curse” in resource-rich regions and support green transformation through market-oriented governance. Yet, conflicting interests among stakeholders often generate strategic interactions that hinder effective policy implementation, highlighting the crucial role of government regulation. This study develops an evolutionary game model involving three key actors—government, enterprises, and farmers—and integrates system dynamics to simulate their strategic evolution over time. Crucially, the model parameters are empirically calibrated against field interview evidence from the Shunchang Forest Eco-Bank pilot in Fujian Province. This calibration incorporates documented labor cost structures, carbon offset revenue ratios from the “One-Yuan Carbon Sink” program, and preferential financing terms extended to platform participants. Sensitivity analysis is further employed to identify the critical variables shaping stakeholder behavior and to optimize the sequencing of regulatory actions. The results demonstrate that restrictive measures have stronger marginal effects on stabilizing stakeholder behavior than incentive-based interventions. Punitive regulation therefore plays a foundational role in establishing initial institutional order, while incentive mechanisms—characterized by threshold effects—are more effective as complementary measures to sustain cooperation in the longer term. Overall, the findings clarify the prioritization of regulatory instruments under the EBP and contribute broader theoretical and practical insights for designing flexible, adaptive governance frameworks in multi-actor policy environments. These insights are relevant not only for advancing sustainable forest management in China but also for informing the governance of ecological resources in other sustainability-oriented contexts.</p>