Does co-located government procurement increase air pollution? Evidence from Chinese counties
摘要
Government procurement of environmental governance services, which aims to advance sustainable development, is affected by local protectionism. Existing studies have not considered co-location in the context of grassroots governance. This study focuses on local protectionism in the framework of promotion tournament theory. Using Chinese county-level panel data from 2016 to 2023 and models such as staggered difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity design, we empirically examine the impact of co-located procurement on air pollution. The findings indicate that county-level centralized procurement significantly increases air pollution. Specifically, centralized procurement involving state-owned enterprises, small-scale investments, and engineering projects has considerably increased air pollution. In addition, this study reveals that green performance assessment, digital governance, and cross-regional governance are feasible measures for mitigating the polluting effect of co-located procurement, thereby providing new insights for advancing the green development of global government procurement and addressing the dilemmas in grassroots environmental governance.