<p>China’s rural areas play a pivotal role in the national energy transition. Although existing research recognizes the importance of rural acquaintance societies, there remains a lack of in-depth understanding of the mechanisms by which peer effects specifically influence farmers’ adoption of clean energy. We argue that peer effects are a crucial yet under-explored catalyst driving the adoption of clean energy in rural areas. Therefore, we focus on how peer effects shape farmers’ clean energy choices under different policy subsidy contexts. This paper employs an evolutionary game approach to construct a two-sided evolutionary game model of farmers’ clean energy adoption, incorporating peer effects as a significant influencing factor. The research findings indicate that peer effects influence farmers’ clean energy choice behavior through three main mechanisms: the information effect, the demonstration effect, and the conformity effect. Furthermore, we find that, over time, the intensity of peer effects significantly increases farmers’ acceptance of and tendency to choose clean energy. We also identify government subsidies as a key driver for promoting farmers’ selection of clean energy and demonstrate that a high policy subsidy coefficient significantly strengthens the impact of peer effects. This study elucidates the intrinsic mechanisms of the rural clean energy transition, enriching and expanding the context and theoretical implications of peer effect research. By clarifying the core catalytic role of peer effects, our research provides theoretical reference and inspiration for promoting the green energy revolution in rural China.</p>