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<p>The rising consumption of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) bottles presents a major challenge for sustainable waste management. While countries like China report high recycling rates, most PET bottles are downcycled, limiting their potential for reuse in closed-loop systems. Deposit Return Schemes (DRS) have emerged as a promising approach to promote bottle-to-bottle recycling and meet the growing demand for bottles containing high-quality recycled content. In this study, we develop an evolutionary game-theoretic model to explore the conditions under which DRS can enable high-value circularity in PET bottle recycling. By integrating empirical data with game theory, our model identifies key thresholds that determine the successful adoption of DRS. We find that regulatory engagement from government agencies (GA) becomes effective when social benefits exceed 0.05 USD, which in turn motivates companies (Co) to adopt DRS and encourages consumers (CUST) to actively participate in recycling, with an optimal deposit of 0.07 USD. Co adopt DRS when the cost difference with conventional collection and sorting methods (CCSM) is below 0.03 USD, with an optimal deposit set at 0.04 USD; likewise, a profit margin of at least 0.04 USD per bottle between DRS and CCSM supports successful implementation at the same deposit level. By contrast, measures such as increasing fines or expanding collection points—without addressing these critical financial thresholds—are unlikely to achieve efficient, same-grade PET recycling.</p>

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How can the deposit return scheme promote the high-value recycling of food contact PET?

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月13日

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  • Wanying Lin,
  • Xingmin Chen,
  • Jinfen Huo,
  • Yuan Chen,
  • Han Yu,
  • Yan Lin

摘要

The rising consumption of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) bottles presents a major challenge for sustainable waste management. While countries like China report high recycling rates, most PET bottles are downcycled, limiting their potential for reuse in closed-loop systems. Deposit Return Schemes (DRS) have emerged as a promising approach to promote bottle-to-bottle recycling and meet the growing demand for bottles containing high-quality recycled content. In this study, we develop an evolutionary game-theoretic model to explore the conditions under which DRS can enable high-value circularity in PET bottle recycling. By integrating empirical data with game theory, our model identifies key thresholds that determine the successful adoption of DRS. We find that regulatory engagement from government agencies (GA) becomes effective when social benefits exceed 0.05 USD, which in turn motivates companies (Co) to adopt DRS and encourages consumers (CUST) to actively participate in recycling, with an optimal deposit of 0.07 USD. Co adopt DRS when the cost difference with conventional collection and sorting methods (CCSM) is below 0.03 USD, with an optimal deposit set at 0.04 USD; likewise, a profit margin of at least 0.04 USD per bottle between DRS and CCSM supports successful implementation at the same deposit level. By contrast, measures such as increasing fines or expanding collection points—without addressing these critical financial thresholds—are unlikely to achieve efficient, same-grade PET recycling.