<p>The coordinated competition of cultivated land utilization for crops(CCLUC) is crucial for ensuring food security and other important agricultural product supplies. We construct an evolutionary game model for coordinating CCLUC from the perspective of multiple stakeholders including government, village collectives, and planting subjects to explore causes for CCLUC and propose a synergistic path for the coordinated CCLUC. The results show that: (1) The “slack government regulation-village collective cooperation-planting subject response” is the optimal state of tripartite evolutionary stabilization strategy for CCLUC. (2) Benefits and costs are main factors influencing the strategic choices of tripartite stakeholders, and the trajectories of strategic choices among stakeholders show that there is an obvious interdependence among them. The regulatory enforcement of government plays a dominant role in the strategic choices of stakeholders, and the strategy choice of village collectives has a key influence on the strategy choices of planting subjects. (3) Constructing a new model of mutual promotion and integrated development of multiple stakeholders with government as the leader, village collective as the link, and planting subject as the main actor is an effective path for coordinating CCLUC. This study could provide a reference for improving productivity of cultivated land and achieving sustainable utilization of land resources.</p>