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<p>Historically, overregulation of the environment by certain local governments has inflicted irreversible economic damage within their jurisdictions. This damage primarily stems from the misalignment between local governments’ environmental goals and the capabilities of regional enterprises. To address this issue, this paper categorizes local governments’ environmental governance objectives into two distinct preferences: high-target and low-target. Additionally, enterprises within the jurisdiction are classified into three types. Based on these two preferences, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between local governments and regional enterprises and proposes optimal strategies for integrated environmental and tax development under different conditions through the analysis of stable equilibrium points. The study concludes as follows: (1) When local governments prefer low-target goals, coordinated optimal development of the environment and economy can be achieved if regional enterprises are in good operating condition, relocation costs are low, and environmental protection costs are not high. (2) When local governments prefer high-target goals, coordinated optimal development of the environment and economy can also be achieved if regional enterprises are in good operating condition, relocation costs are high, and additional environmental protection costs are relatively low. (3) When a sufficient proportion of enterprises within the region have achieved low-target goals, high-target goals can, in fact, better promote the development of both the environment and the economy.</p>

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Co-evolution of environmental governance and economic development under the preference of local governments

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月6日

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  • Meiqi Wang,
  • Zhuo Zhang

摘要

Historically, overregulation of the environment by certain local governments has inflicted irreversible economic damage within their jurisdictions. This damage primarily stems from the misalignment between local governments’ environmental goals and the capabilities of regional enterprises. To address this issue, this paper categorizes local governments’ environmental governance objectives into two distinct preferences: high-target and low-target. Additionally, enterprises within the jurisdiction are classified into three types. Based on these two preferences, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between local governments and regional enterprises and proposes optimal strategies for integrated environmental and tax development under different conditions through the analysis of stable equilibrium points. The study concludes as follows: (1) When local governments prefer low-target goals, coordinated optimal development of the environment and economy can be achieved if regional enterprises are in good operating condition, relocation costs are low, and environmental protection costs are not high. (2) When local governments prefer high-target goals, coordinated optimal development of the environment and economy can also be achieved if regional enterprises are in good operating condition, relocation costs are high, and additional environmental protection costs are relatively low. (3) When a sufficient proportion of enterprises within the region have achieved low-target goals, high-target goals can, in fact, better promote the development of both the environment and the economy.