<p>In the new era of the "dual carbon" goals, collaborative green governance centered on carbon reduction among local governments in Chinese cities as "pioneers" is extremely urgent and necessary. However, breaking out of the fragmented governance dilemma and establishing a long-term, stable collaborative mechanism remains a major challenge. Combining evolutionary game theory with complex network theory, we construct an asymmetric complex network evolutionary game model for green governance of carbon reduction, which contains core and non-core groups of urban local governments. Subsequently, the formal and informal collaborative practices among local governments in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) region in many fields of carbon reduction source governance are used as the basis for the inter-governmental relations network. Simulation experiments are employed to explore the key factors that influence the green governance collaboration of urban carbon reduction in the YRD region. The research findings indicate that moderately differentiated resource endowments between cities can effectively stimulate the voluntary intention of local government collaboration in green governance. Increased share of non-core local government net benefits, as well as the enhancement of positive and negative externalities resulting from heterogeneity in carbon governance behavior among local governments, can more rapidly and effectively promote the network collaboration evolution. Vertical intervention by the central government and horizontal transfer compensation for carbon ecology serve as vital supplements to inter-governmental self-organization. However, the efficacy varies. Only transfer payments and horizontal transfer compensation for carbon ecology drive full collaboration, while punitive measures fail to achieve the same effect.</p>