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<p>As global environmental concerns intensify, government interventions through incentivized and penalized schemes are increasingly essential for advancing green supply chain management. This study constructs a game-theoretic evolutionary framework to examine the strategic dynamics among manufacturers, retailers, and governmental bodies, emphasizing the multifaceted interdependencies governing their interactions. By employing replicator equation methods and equilibrium stability assessments, the investigation identifies and models evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) for each stakeholder group. A subsequent empirical case study from China validates the analytical findings, reinforcing key outcomes: eight equilibrium states and four possible ESS configurations, dependent on the cost–benefit considerations of the involved entities; increased efforts in green production and marketing consistently enhance manufacturers’ sustainability, although their impact on retailers and government responses varies, particularly at lower effort levels; while lower government penalties lead to deviations from green practices, higher penalties promote compliance and encourage the implementation of supportive incentives, thereby improving overall regulatory efficiency. The results thus provide a detailed analysis of effective strategies for various stakeholders and offer recommendations for refining incentives to enhance regulatory frameworks and market outcomes.</p>

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From penalties to profits: how government regulation and cost-revenue trade-offs shape green production and marketing

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月27日

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  • Ke Jiang,
  • Mengjia Leng,
  • Yan Jiang,
  • Liping Xu

摘要

As global environmental concerns intensify, government interventions through incentivized and penalized schemes are increasingly essential for advancing green supply chain management. This study constructs a game-theoretic evolutionary framework to examine the strategic dynamics among manufacturers, retailers, and governmental bodies, emphasizing the multifaceted interdependencies governing their interactions. By employing replicator equation methods and equilibrium stability assessments, the investigation identifies and models evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) for each stakeholder group. A subsequent empirical case study from China validates the analytical findings, reinforcing key outcomes: eight equilibrium states and four possible ESS configurations, dependent on the cost–benefit considerations of the involved entities; increased efforts in green production and marketing consistently enhance manufacturers’ sustainability, although their impact on retailers and government responses varies, particularly at lower effort levels; while lower government penalties lead to deviations from green practices, higher penalties promote compliance and encourage the implementation of supportive incentives, thereby improving overall regulatory efficiency. The results thus provide a detailed analysis of effective strategies for various stakeholders and offer recommendations for refining incentives to enhance regulatory frameworks and market outcomes.