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<p>Given consumers’ growing preference for sustainable products and the impact of reference prices, supply chain firms often exhibit notable overconfidence when determining optimal pricing and product greenness. Investigating how this overconfidence, influenced by reference price, shapes green supply chain operations can provide effective strategies for fostering collaboration. A Stackelberg game framework is used to develop models for centralized decisions, decentralized decisions and revenue-sharing contract. Additionally, we derive optimal pricing strategies across different models and improves the supply chain coordination by using a revenue-sharing contract mechanism. The results indicate that retailers' overconfidence, when shaped by reference pricing perceptions, adversely affects green product adoption. As overconfidence intensifies, wholesale and retail prices, product greenness, and manufacturer profits decline, whereas retailer profits initially rise before ultimately falling. Implementing revenue-sharing agreements improves overall supply chain profitability, mitigates overconfidence, and facilitates coordination. These findings offer strategic guidance for green supply chain firms, particularly in contexts where overconfidence and reference price considerations are pivotal.</p>

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Pricing and coordination in green supply chains: The impact of overconfident retailers under reference price effect

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月7日

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  • Zhen Chen,
  • Kaveh Khalilpour,
  • Liangshan Shao,
  • Rui Zhao,
  • Xintong Li,
  • Qingzhen Yao

摘要

Given consumers’ growing preference for sustainable products and the impact of reference prices, supply chain firms often exhibit notable overconfidence when determining optimal pricing and product greenness. Investigating how this overconfidence, influenced by reference price, shapes green supply chain operations can provide effective strategies for fostering collaboration. A Stackelberg game framework is used to develop models for centralized decisions, decentralized decisions and revenue-sharing contract. Additionally, we derive optimal pricing strategies across different models and improves the supply chain coordination by using a revenue-sharing contract mechanism. The results indicate that retailers' overconfidence, when shaped by reference pricing perceptions, adversely affects green product adoption. As overconfidence intensifies, wholesale and retail prices, product greenness, and manufacturer profits decline, whereas retailer profits initially rise before ultimately falling. Implementing revenue-sharing agreements improves overall supply chain profitability, mitigates overconfidence, and facilitates coordination. These findings offer strategic guidance for green supply chain firms, particularly in contexts where overconfidence and reference price considerations are pivotal.