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<p>In the context of global environmental governance, the government-enterprise ecological compensation mechanism is of pivotal significance in the mitigation of deleterious environmental impacts and the preservation of ecosystems. However, the prevailing mechanisms are characterised by deficiencies in their reward and punishment systems and an inability to account for the costs of environmental degradation. The present paper is founded upon the principles of differential game theory. It proposes an ecological compensation model that integrates the dynamic changes of pollutants with the objectives of governments and enterprises. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) the government reward and punishment coefficients are found to be of critical importance, with excessive or insufficient levels having the potential to hinder the effectiveness of the mechanism. (2) The cost of environmental degradation is found to have a significant impact on government decisions, with a low coefficient potentially resulting in a prioritisation of economic interests over environmental concerns. (3) It is recommended that the central government enforce measures to foster cooperation, such as increased supervision and the integration of environmental performance in evaluations. (4) Real-time assessment models are preferred over end-of-period models for profit calculations. This study offers theoretical support and insights for optimizing the government-enterprise eco-compensation mechanism and existing policies.</p>

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Eco-compensation between government and enterprises under the reward and punishment system in watershed management: a differential game approach

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月13日

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  • Zuliang Lu,
  • Mingsong Li,
  • Ruixiang Xu,
  • Lu Xing,
  • Junman Li

摘要

In the context of global environmental governance, the government-enterprise ecological compensation mechanism is of pivotal significance in the mitigation of deleterious environmental impacts and the preservation of ecosystems. However, the prevailing mechanisms are characterised by deficiencies in their reward and punishment systems and an inability to account for the costs of environmental degradation. The present paper is founded upon the principles of differential game theory. It proposes an ecological compensation model that integrates the dynamic changes of pollutants with the objectives of governments and enterprises. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) the government reward and punishment coefficients are found to be of critical importance, with excessive or insufficient levels having the potential to hinder the effectiveness of the mechanism. (2) The cost of environmental degradation is found to have a significant impact on government decisions, with a low coefficient potentially resulting in a prioritisation of economic interests over environmental concerns. (3) It is recommended that the central government enforce measures to foster cooperation, such as increased supervision and the integration of environmental performance in evaluations. (4) Real-time assessment models are preferred over end-of-period models for profit calculations. This study offers theoretical support and insights for optimizing the government-enterprise eco-compensation mechanism and existing policies.