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<p>In the pursuit of decarbonization and sustainability within the agricultural sector, agricultural green technology innovation (AGTI) emerges as a pivotal catalyst. Nevertheless, the presence of dual externalities often undercuts the entrepreneurial incentive for such innovation. This paper constructs a tripartite game model of AGTI involving heterogeneous enterprises and financial institutions from an environmental regulation perspective. The analysis systematically evaluates the ramifications of incentive-driven, penalty-based, and market-oriented environmental regulations on the establishment of an AGTI framework for heterogeneous business entities and banking sectors. The simulation outcomes reveal the following insights: (1) Moderate environmental tax expedites the adoption of technologies by conventional firms. (2) Incentive-based regulation is more conducive to the construction of the AGTI system, with innovation subsidies outperforming technology adoption subsidies in terms of system sophistication, albeit with some distortion in resource allocation. (3) Reducing transaction costs associated with groundbreaking AGTI accelerates the realization of a comprehensive innovation system. (4) Mitigating market uncertainties stands as a critical strategy for propelling AGTI to greater heights. These findings proffer valuable insights for policymakers in crafting effective environmental policies and offer theoretical underpinnings for the advancement of a green, low-carbon agricultural economy.</p>

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Strategy research of stakeholders in the construction of agricultural green technology innovation system: an evolutionary game analysis

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月2日

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  • Jianli Luo,
  • Mingjun Hu,
  • Minmin Huang,
  • Yanhu Bai

摘要

In the pursuit of decarbonization and sustainability within the agricultural sector, agricultural green technology innovation (AGTI) emerges as a pivotal catalyst. Nevertheless, the presence of dual externalities often undercuts the entrepreneurial incentive for such innovation. This paper constructs a tripartite game model of AGTI involving heterogeneous enterprises and financial institutions from an environmental regulation perspective. The analysis systematically evaluates the ramifications of incentive-driven, penalty-based, and market-oriented environmental regulations on the establishment of an AGTI framework for heterogeneous business entities and banking sectors. The simulation outcomes reveal the following insights: (1) Moderate environmental tax expedites the adoption of technologies by conventional firms. (2) Incentive-based regulation is more conducive to the construction of the AGTI system, with innovation subsidies outperforming technology adoption subsidies in terms of system sophistication, albeit with some distortion in resource allocation. (3) Reducing transaction costs associated with groundbreaking AGTI accelerates the realization of a comprehensive innovation system. (4) Mitigating market uncertainties stands as a critical strategy for propelling AGTI to greater heights. These findings proffer valuable insights for policymakers in crafting effective environmental policies and offer theoretical underpinnings for the advancement of a green, low-carbon agricultural economy.