An evolutionary game study on carbon emission reduction considering a reward and punishment allocation mechanism: from the perspective of low-carbon service suppliers participation

Carbon emission reduction (CER) is receiving increasing attention from governments, enterprises, the public, scholars and other people worldwide. However, most carbon-emitting enterprises are unable to realize CER through self-technology upgrading. Low-carbon service suppliers can provide CER services to carbon-emitting enterprises through technology or business, thereby promoting the effective implementation of related policies. Strengthening the cooperation between low-carbon service suppliers and carbon-emitting enterprises is an important breakthrough in achieving CER. From the perspective of organizational behavior, this study introduces a reward and punishment allocation mechanism (RPAM) and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game (TEG) model including carbon-emitting enterprises, low-carbon service suppliers and government. Then, the tripartite stability strategy is analyzed, and the influence of the parameters is simulated by MATLAB. The study reveals there exists four evolutionarily stable states for tripartite strategic selection, and the specific evolution of these states is comprehensively affected by various factors. Specifically, (1) the increased severity of punishment, the loss of reputation and the high cost for enterprises to produce high-carbon products all have a positive impact on strategic selection of enterprises and service providers; (2) there is a reasonable range for government subsidies, excessive subsidies have negative effects, and the enterprise is the focus of reward and punishment allocation; (3) reducing the cost for enterprises to purchase CER services slows the convergence rate of the service providers and government in the short term but eventually helps the system optimized; (4) although reducing the service costs of low-carbon service suppliers slows the strategic convergence speed of enterprises and government in the short run, it is beneficial for system reaching a desired state; (5) compared with government subsidies, both enterprises and service providers are more sensitive to government penalties, and compared with service providers, enterprises exhibit stronger revenue and penalty sensitivity; (6) reducing government supervision costs can not only effectively prevent the occurrence of government regulatory deficiencies but also improve the strategic selection of enterprises and low-carbon service suppliers. According to conclusions, by setting appropriate reward and punishment levels and reward and punishment allocation coefficients, improving the reputation mechanism of enterprises and low-carbon service suppliers, continuously reducing the CER service costs of low-carbon service suppliers, optimizing government regulatory methods, and other means is helpful to promoting the positive behaviors of the three parties, thereby promoting long-term stable CER cooperation between enterprises and low-carbon service suppliers and ultimately promoting low-carbon economy (LCE) growth.