<p>Water pollution is a global environmental concern, especially in developing countries. Divergent interests among various stakeholders pose significant challenges to&#xa0;controlling water pollution effectively. Exploring the interest preferences and behavioral strategy selection of stakeholders is essential for addressing these challenges. In this study, the decision—making processes of key stakeholders—central and local governments, enterprises and the public-involved in water pollution control are examined through a top-down systematic game model. Additionally, an innovative governance model considering water credit mechanism is developed to mitigate water pollution. Taking Tianjin as an example, which is a typical city facing water pollution challenges in Northern China, the effectiveness of the novel model is demonstrated. The results show that China’s water pollution control involves two stages, public authority regulation and market-oriented governance. However, cooperative governance, which yields better results in controlling water pollution, is difficult to establish in these stages due to the lack of a systematic interest coordination framework. The novel model proposed in this study has been demonstrated to effectively coordinate the interests of all key stakeholders through water credit mechanism.&#xa0;This will help achieve the cooperation governance which can effectively control water pollution.</p>