Research on stability strategy based on the dynamic evolution game of promoting low-carbon building green building materials market
摘要
Encouraging the manufacture and use of low-carbon green building materials (GBM) is an important aspect of advancing green building initiatives. The market for low-carbon green building materials is a complex system with multiple factors intertwined and various stakeholders mutually constraining each other. This paper constructs a game model from the perspective of the green supply chain involving the government, building materials manufacturers (BMM), and real estate developers (RED) to effectively incentivize the market for low-carbon green building materials. It utilizes MATLAB to model the evolutionary trajectories of the three parties for analysis. The findings are as follows: (1) Compared to subsidy policies, the government prefers penalty policies, while manufacturers of building materials and real estate developers favor subsidies, with the latter showing the strongest response. (2) Building materials manufacturers' and real estate developers’ willingness to adopt proactive strategies increases with the intensity of subsidies and penalties but decreases with the rise in additional costs. (3) Real estate developers tend to select green building materials when both the government and building materials manufacturers adopt proactive strategies. This study can help the government formulate effective subsidy and penalty policies, incentivizing manufacturers and developers to promote green building materials actively. It supports the healthy development of the low-carbon green building materials market and offers theoretical references to enhance the construction industry’s environmental friendliness, thus holding significant practical value.