Stalemate or consensus? Evolution of stakeholders’ behavioral strategies in construction land reduction in China

Amidst the backdrop of excessive construction land expansion, construction land reduction (CLR) has been proposed by China as a characteristic means to ensure and promote sustainable land use. The involvement of stakeholders in CLR, especially the different dynamic behavioral strategies of key stakeholders, determines the ultimate success or failure of CLR. This study aims to understand the evolution of the key stakeholders’ behavioral strategies and to achieve consensus among the key stakeholders in CLR. To achieve this, this study constructs evolutionary game models involving the key stakeholders of CLR to analyze and simulate their behavioral strategies and the impacts of various factors on their behavioral strategies through theoretical analysis and an empirical study in Shanghai. The results show that: (1) Consensus and full realization of CLR can only be achieved when one of the municipal & district governments (MGs) and township governments (TGs) is more proactive and both peasant households (PHs) and industrial enterprises (IEs) support CLR. (2) The evolutionary outcomes are influenced by compensations and incentives, implementation areas, and future options of stakeholders. Accordingly, practical managerial implications are proposed: enhancing multi-stakeholder participation, establishing a sound and dynamic compensation and incentive mechanism, and diversifying financing approaches to extend the scope of CLR. Overall, this study theoretically provides unified models of stakeholders’ behavioral strategies in CLR, and practically facilitates consensus for the success of CLR.