<p>This study models the Tragedy of the Commons as an emergent property of a complex adaptive system using a dynamic agent-based framework that integrates ecological and economic dynamics. By incorporating non-linear interactions, feedback loops, interconnectedness, adaptive behaviors, and stochastic processes, the model simulates how individual agents exploit a shared renewable resource. The effectiveness of various policy interventions – taxes, quotas, market exclusion, and cap-and-trade – is assessed. Findings reveal that taxes, quotas, and cap-and-trade systems effectively mitigate the Tragedy of the Commons by altering agents’ incentives and stabilizing resource stocks, though each exhibits different impacts on economic activity and resource sustainability. In contrast, market exclusion mechanisms prove ineffective, as agents intensify exploitation prior to exclusion, accelerating depletion. We further show that non-tradable quotas with adaptive regulation of aggregate effort consistently deliver the fastest ecological rebound while preserving higher levels of economic activity, outperforming both Pigouvian levies and permit trading across a wide range of peer-influence and investment-response parameters. The research deepens the understanding of resource management in complex systems and contributes to complexity economics by moving beyond traditional assumptions of equilibrium and optimality.</p>